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I.

INTRODUCTION

The American juvenile justice system was first established in 1825
when the Society for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency created the
New York House of Refuge to house and rehabilitate troubled youth.1
Juvenile offenders stayed at “reform schools,” like the New York House
of Refuge.2 These reform schools sought to rehabilitate juvenile
offenders, as well as protect them from adult criminal offenders.3 Cook
County, Illinois established the first juvenile court in 1899, and by 1924,
most states had established juvenile court systems.4 These early juvenile
court systems were premised on the parens patriae doctrine, emphasizing
“an informal, nonadversarial, and flexible approach to cases[,]” and the
paramount goal of the juvenile courts was to rehabilitate the juvenile
offenders.5 This was accomplished in part by housing juvenile offenders
in reform schools, separated from adult criminal offenders.6
In the late 1960s, the Supreme Court recognized that juvenile
offenders have the same constitutional rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause as their adult counterparts.7 Beginning
1

See ABA Div. for Pub. Educ., The History of Juvenile Justice, at 5 (Apr. 9, 2007),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features/DYJpart1.authc
heckdam.pdf; 18 U.S.C. § 5031 (2016) (defining “juvenile” as a person who is under
eighteen years old). This Author will use “juvenile” and “adolescent” interchangeably
throughout this Comment.
2 ABA Div. for Pub. Educ., supra note 1.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 See id. (defining parens patriae as the state’s “power to serve as a guardian (or
parent) for those with legal disabilities, including juveniles”).
6 See id.
7 See ELIZABETH S. SCOTT & LAURENCE STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE 8
(Harvard Univ. Press) (paperback ed. 2010); see also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 41, 55–
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in the 1970s and continuing through the early 1990s, juvenile crime,
specifically violent crime, increased, as did a desire for a more punitive
juvenile system.8 Critics of the rehabilitative juvenile justice model
demanded reform; as a result, more juveniles, considered by some
criminologists to be “super-predators,”9 were transferred to the adult
criminal system.10 Juvenile arrest rates began to decline in 1996 and have
been steadily declining since 2006.11 In addition, the notion that juvenile
offenders are “super-predators” has faded.12 Moreover, recent legislative
and policy reforms in numerous states as well as Supreme Court decisions
such as Roper v. Simmons, which abolished the juvenile death penalty,
indicate a movement away from such harsh treatment of juvenile
offenders.13
While the juvenile justice system has evolved and fluctuated in
significant ways since its inception, one principle remains constant:
“children are different.”14 In 2015, the Third Circuit ignored this
fundamental truth when it held in J.B. v. Fassnacht that juvenile detention
centers may impose a blanket strip search policy upon all juvenile
detainees entering the general population.15 The Third Circuit referred
extensively to the Supreme Court’s decision in Florence v. Board of

57 (1967) (holding that juvenile offenders have a constitutional right to sufficient notice of
charges, notification of right to counsel, adequate safeguards against self-incrimination,
and confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses).
8 See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 6–9, 84 (noting a period of “‘moral panic’
in which politicians, the public, and the media respond[ed] on the basis of exaggerated
perceptions of threat” even during the mid-1990s when juvenile crime began to decline);
see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and the
Regulation of Youth Crime, 18:2 THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN 17–18 (2008) (noting states
enacted “automatic transfer statutes, under which many youths [were] categorically treated
as adults when they [were] charged with crimes—either generally . . . or for specific
crimes . . . ”) (internal citation omitted).
9 See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 6 n.12.
10 See id. at 5–9, 94–96.
11 OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK: JUVENILE ARREST RATE TRENDS,
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/crime/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05200 (noting that juvenile
arrest rates for all offenses have declined by seventy percent since 1996).
12 See SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 11.
13 Id. at 11–13. See also 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005).
14 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 480–81 (2012) (referring to juveniles). See also
SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 29 (arguing that “scientific knowledge about
cognitive, psychosocial, and neurobiological development in adolescents supports the
conclusion that juveniles are different from adults in fundamental ways that bear on
decisions about their appropriate treatment within the justice system—and that this
scientific knowledge should be the foundation of the legal regulation of juvenile crime”)
(emphasis added).
15 801 F.3d 336, 337, 341 (3d Cir. 2015) (Fuentes, Nygaard & Roth, JJ.), cert. denied,
2016 U.S. LEXIS 2036 (Mar. 21, 2016) (No. 15-903).
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Chosen Freeholders, which held that a correctional facility may enforce a
universal strip search policy on all detainees entering the general
population.16 “Using Florence as a guidepost,” the Third Circuit noted
that the Florence Court did not carve out an exception for juvenile
detainees, and the institutional security risks at an adult jail are the same
as those at juvenile detention center.17 Thus, the Third Circuit determined
that the Supreme Court’s decision in Florence governed strip searches of
juvenile detainees at juvenile detention centers.18 By doing so, the Third
Circuit treated juveniles as “miniature adults.”19
The Third Circuit incorrectly decided J.B. v. Fassnacht in three
significant ways. First, the Third Circuit failed to meaningfully consider
the psychological and developmental factors that distinguish juveniles
from adults, as well as Supreme Court precedent which found age a
determinative factor in assessing culpability. Second, the Third Circuit
incorrectly found that the risks and dangers presented at adult jails are the
same as those presented at juvenile facilities, implying that juveniles are
miniature adults. Finally, the Third Circuit improperly held that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Florence governed the issue. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Safford United School District #1 v. Redding sets forth
the applicable precedent for searches of juveniles, requiring an
individualized determination standard, instead of Florence’s categorical
rule.20 As provided in Safford, there must be an individualized, reasonable
suspicion that a juvenile detainee is dangerous or hiding contraband before
a correctional officer may conduct a strip search.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the Third Circuit’s decision and
reasoning in J.B. v. Fassnacht. Part III of this Comment will address the
relevant Supreme Court precedent. Part IV will argue that the Third
Circuit incorrectly decided J.B. v. Fassnacht. Part V will contend that an
individualized, reasonable suspicion standard, as set forth in Safford, in
the context of juvenile detention center strip searches, is more aligned with
traditional Fourth Amendment principles, and more appropriate, than the
administrative search policy provided in Florence. Part VI briefly
concludes.

16

Id. at 339–47. See also 566 U.S. 318, 322–23 (2012).
See Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 342–43, 346–47.
18 Id. at 337, 341.
19 Miller, 567 U.S. at 481 (noting that historically, laws and the judiciary have
recognized that children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults) (internal citation
omitted).
20 See 557 U.S. 364, 370, 377 (2009).
17
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II. J.B. V. FASSNACHT AND UNIVERSAL STRIP SEARCHES IN
JUVENILE DETENTION CENTERS
J.B. was twelve years old when he created a homemade flame
thrower with a “PVC pipe, a lighter, and some spray paint.”21 The one to
two-foot flames attracted some neighborhood girls, whose babysitter told
J.B. to stop playing with the object.22 The girls later approached J.B. and
teased him.23 A fight ensued, and J.B. held a homemade knife over a girl’s
head and said he could kill her.24 A parent called a police officer to the
incident, and a juvenile allegation of “terroristic threats and summary
harassment” was filed three weeks later.25 J.B. was subsequently detained
at the Lancaster County Youth Intervention Center (“LCYIC”) because
the charges were serious.26 When he arrived at LCYIC, J.B. was processed
and strip searched under facility policy.27 An officer led J.B. to the shower
area, closed a privacy curtain and told J.B. to “drop his pants and
underwear, bend over, spread his buttocks, and cough.”28 J.B. was
exposed to the officer for approximately ninety seconds.29 LCYIC
detained J.B. for approximately four days before releasing him to his
parents.30 At his juvenile hearing, J.B. did not contest the charges against
him, and he agreed to write an apology letter to the victims and to abide
by his probation conditions.31 In exchange, his record would be
expunged.32

21

Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 337.
Id. See also Brief for Appellees at 5, J.B. v. Fassnacht, 801 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2015)
(No. 14-3905), 2015 WL 1606873, at *5 (noting “[t]he girls started teasing J.B., and there
was some name calling among the children.”); Brief and Appendix for Appellants at 11,
J.B. v. Fassnacht, 801 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-3905), 2015 WL 502836, at *11
(noting “[l]ater that day, the same girls came to the J.B.’s front yard and began teasing J.B.
which led to a hand-to-hand fighting between him and at least two of the girls . . . ”).
23 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 337.
24 Id. at 337–38 (noting that J.B. told the girl “he was stronger than her, ‘so [he could]
kill [her] and over power [her].’”) (alteration in original). See also Brief for Appellees,
supra note 22, at 5 (noting that J.B. held the knife “over the head of another playmate . . . in
a joking manner.”).
25 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 338. See also Brief for Appellees, supra note 22, at 6 (noting
that the responding police officer informed J.B.’s father that a father of one of the girls
wished to file charges, and after his [the officer’s] vacation, “he would look into it”).
26 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 338.
27 Id. (“This policy states that such searches are conducted to look for signs of ‘injuries,
markings, skin conditions, signs of abuse, or further contraband.’”) (internal citation
omitted).
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 See id.
31 Id.
32 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 338.
22
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J.B.’s parents sued the police officers, Lancaster County Office of
Juvenile Probation officials, and LCYIC officials on his behalf, alleging,
among other things, unreasonable search and seizure.33 The defendants
argued that this allegation failed under Florence v. Bd. of Chosen
Freeholders.34 The District Court rejected the defendants’ argument and
held that Florence did not apply to juvenile detainees, as it only addressed
strip searches of adult inmates.35 Concerned by the three-week gap
between the incident and J.B.’s detention, the District Court reasoned that
there was a “genuine issue of material fact” whether the correctional
officers had “reasonable suspicion to strip search J.B[.]”36 The District
Court certified to the Third Circuit the question of “whether Florence
applies to all juveniles being committed to a juvenile detention facility.”37
On appeal, J.B.’s parents argued that Florence is limited to adult
detainees.38 J.B.’s parents argued that Safford United School District #1
v. Redding governs searches of juveniles; therefore, a correctional officer
must have an individualized, reasonable suspicion to believe a juvenile
detainee is concealing contraband, before conducting a strip search.39
Finding that Safford only governed strip searches of juveniles in schools,
the Third Circuit rejected J.B.’s argument, holding that Florence applies
to all juvenile detainees entering a juvenile detention center’s general
population.40 The Third Circuit reasoned that the three institutional
security risks the Supreme Court identified in Florence applied to juvenile
detention centers.41 A universal strip search policy “make[s] good sense”
because (1) new detainees could introduce lice or contagious infections to
the general population; (2) an increased number of gang members going
through the intake process increases the likelihood of violence in the
facility; and (3) new detainees may conceal contraband.42 The Third
Circuit believed “[t]here [was] no easy way to distinguish between
juvenile and adult detainees in terms of the security risks cited by the
Supreme Court in Florence.”43 While it acknowledged in passing that
33 Id. (Specifically, J.B.’s parents asserted “various civil rights violations under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 for false arrest, unreasonable search and seizure, false imprisonment, and
violations of due process against various prison officials.”).
34 See id.
35 Id. at 338–39.
36 Id. at 339.
37 Id.
38 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 342.
39 See id. at 344.
40 See id. at 337, 341, 344.
41 Id. at 342. See infra Part III, Section B.
42 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d. at 342, 346. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566
U.S. 318, 330–33 (2012).
43 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 343.
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“youth . . . is a . . . condition of life when a person may be most
susceptible . . . to psychological damage . . . [c]hildren are especially
susceptible to possible traumas from strip searches[,]”44 the Third Circuit
found that the state’s legitimate interest in ensuring the facility is secure
outweighs a juvenile detainee’s privacy interests.45 Juvenile detainees
pose the same risks as those noted in Florence, which means that juvenile
detainees may pose significant dangers to other detainees, detention center
staff, and themselves.46 The Third Circuit held that a universal strip search
of juvenile detainees before admission to the general population of a
juvenile detention center serves legitimate penological interests.47
The Third Circuit also reasoned that, unlike adult detainees, the state
acts in loco parentis during a juvenile’s detention period;48 the
individualized, reasonable suspicion inquiry is problematic;49 and
Florence did not carve out an exception for juvenile detainees.50 The court
first noted that juveniles are presumptively under the control of their
parents; however, if that control falters, such as when juveniles are
detained, the state assumes control over the juvenile, acting in loco
parentis.51 In this situation, the state’s “enhanced responsibility to screen
for signs of disease, self-mutilation, or abuse in the home” may outweigh
the juvenile’s privacy interests.52
Second, an individualized, reasonable suspicion standard is
impractical because, as the Florence Court noted, correctional officers
know little about the detainee during intake, and new detainees might lie
about their identity.53 Because correctional officers have limited
information, it is unreasonable for them to assume that the new detainee
standing in front of them has not smuggled something into the facility. 54
Moreover, the Supreme Court has consistently acknowledged that
“blanket policies in prison administration” are useful.55 During the intake
44

Id. at 342 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (also acknowledging that strip
searches are “a serious intrusion upon personal rights[,] an offense to the dignity of the
individual[,] and demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terrifying,
unpleasant, embarrassing, and repulsive[]”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
45 Id. at 344.
46 Id. at 342.
47 Id. at 340.
48 Id. at 343 (stating that “juveniles pose risks unique from those of adults[,]” thus
implying that that the state’s in loco parentis role over the juvenile is the only thing
distinguishing juvenile from adult detainees).
49 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 344–45.
50 Id. at 346.
51 See id. at 343 n.41.
52 See id. at 343–44 (internal citation omitted).
53 Id. at 344–45.
54 Id. at 345.
55 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 345.
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process, it is almost impossible for a correctional officer to identify a
detainee who has a propensity for “violence, escape, or drug smuggling.”56
In addition, classifications based upon individualized assessment risk
discriminatory application, for a correctional officer might strip search a
detainee based on characteristics such as race, sex, age, or accent.57
Alternatively, a correctional officer, in an effort to avoid liability, may
decide not to conduct a strip search “in [a] close case” and expose the
entire detention center population to unnecessary risk.58
Finally, the Third Circuit determined that the Florence Court did not
carve out “an exception for juvenile detainees.”59 When the Court stated
it would not rule on whether other kinds of searches would be reasonable
if a detainee is not admitted to the general population, it did not mean to
imply that strip searches of juvenile detainees would provide an example
of when other kinds of searches would be reasonable (i.e. strip searches
would be unreasonable).60 Under the Third Circuit’s interpretation of
Florence, any potential exceptions the Supreme Court may have carved
out do not include exceptions based on age classifications.61 Correctional
officers in any detention facility have an “‘essential interest in readily
administrable rules[;]’”62 as a result, “blanket strip search policies upon
admission to the general population of a jail, regardless of whether the
detainee is a juvenile or adult, make good sense.”63
III. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
A. School Searches and Individualized Suspicion
In Safford United School District #1 v. Redding, the Supreme Court
held that the strip search of a student violated the Fourth Amendment
because it was unreasonable in its scope.64 Following a report from
another student, the assistant principal asked thirteen-year-old Savana
Redding if she knew anything about prescription and over-the-counter

56

Id. at 345 (citing Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 327 (2012)).
Id. at 345.
58 Id. at 346 (citing Florence, 566 U.S. at 337).
59 Id.
60 See id.
61 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 346–47 (noting the Supreme Court used broad, sweeping
language like “jail” to include “prisons and other detention facilities” and “every” and “all”
when depicting who will be strip searched and therefore meant to include juveniles).
62 Id. at 346 (quoting Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001)).
63 Id. (citing Florence, 566 U.S. at 338).
64 557 U.S. 364, 368, 376–77 (2009).
57
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pills, deemed contraband pursuant to school rules.65 Savana allowed the
assistant principal and an administrative assistant to search her backpack,
but they did not find any pills.66 The assistant then took Savana to the
school nurse’s office to search her clothes for the alleged pills.67 After
Savana removed her outer clothing and shoes, the assistant and nurse
(“school officials”) told Savana to remove her pants and T-shirt.68 The
school officials told Savana, who was standing in front of them in her bra
and underpants, to “pull her bra out and to the side and shake it, and to pull
out the elastic on her underpants . . . exposing her breasts and pelvic
area[.]”69 The school officials did not find any pills.70
The Supreme Court held that the strip search of Savana was
unconstitutional because the “content of the suspicion,” that Savana was
providing contraband pills to fellow students, “failed to match the degree
of intrusion,” the strip search.71 Savana exposing “her breasts and pelvic
area to some degree” to two school officials coupled with “subjective and
reasonable societal expectations of personal privacy” warranted the
conclusion that this kind of search was categorically distinct from “a
search of outer clothing and belongings.”72 This kind of intrusive search,
therefore, demanded that distinct elements be met before school
authorities search a student in this manner.73 The Court reasoned that the
test for searches of children by school officials was set forth in New Jersey
v. T.L.O.74 The Supreme Court in T.L.O. held that a school official must
have reasonable suspicion to search a student.75 When the “measures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the
nature of the infraction,” a school official’s search of a student is
permissible.76
Applying T.L.O., the Safford Court held that the assistant principal
had a reasonable suspicion to search Savana’s backpack and outer
See id. at 368 (The pills in question were “four white prescription-strength ibuprofen
400-mg pills, and one over-the counter blue naproxen 200-mg pill, all used for pain and
inflammation but banned under school rules without advance permission.”).
66 Id.
67 Id. at 369. Both the administrative assistant and school nurse were women.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Safford, 557 U.S. at 369.
71 See id. at 375–77.
72 Id. at 374.
73 Id.
74 See id. at 370.
75 New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 341–42 (1985).
76 Safford, 557 U.S. at 370. A “school search” is another way of referring to a school
official’s search of a student.
65
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clothing.77 The Court reasoned that based on the assistant principal’s prior
conversations with two other students, the assistant principal could have
reasonably suspected Savana of providing contraband pills to her fellow
students, and it was reasonable for the assistant principal to suspect that
Savana was carrying the pills on her person or in her backpack.78 The
Court held that the search of Savana’s bag in the privacy of the assistant
principal’s office, and the school nurse’s subsequent search of Savana’s
outer clothing were not excessively intrusive.79 Nevertheless, the Court
found that there was no indication of danger, and no reason to suppose that
Savana was carrying pills in her underwear.80 In other words, for a school
search to reasonably make the jump from a student’s outer clothes to
intimate parts, there must be a reasonable suspicion of danger or that the
student has resorted to hiding contraband in his or her underwear.81 The
Court explained that reasonable suspicion is required before a strip search
is performed because “[t]he meaning of such a search, and the degradation
its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intrusive in a category
of its own demanding its own specific suspicions.”82
The Court noted its concerns about the potential psychological
effects that an invasive search may have on adolescents.83 Savana clearly
had a subjective expectation of privacy, for she described the strip search
as “embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating.”84 Indeed, such a search
is an affront to any adolescent’s sense of bodily integrity and dignity.
Noting that adolescents feel this kind of invasion particularly acutely, the
Court reasoned that Savana’s expectation of privacy was reasonable and
consistent with experiences of other adolescents similarly searched
“whose adolescent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the
exposure.”85 The Court held that the strip search was unreasonable, and
that it violated Savana’s Fourth Amendment rights to privacy.86

77

Id. at 373–74.
Id. at 371–74.
79 Id. at 374.
80 See id. at 376–77.
81 Id. at 377.
82 See Safford, 557 U.S. at 377.
83 See id. 375.
84 Id. at 374–75.
85 Id. at 375 (noting the important distinction between the bodily exposure Savana
experienced during the search and the bodily exposure school students experience when,
for example, changing for gym, and reasoning that changing “for play” has an entirely
different meaning than a search “exposing the body” in response to an accusation of
wrongdoing) (internal citations omitted).
86 Id. at 379.
78
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B. Blanket Strip Search Policies in Adult Jails
In Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, the Supreme Court held
that a correctional facility may constitutionally impose a universal strip
search policy on all detainees admitted to the general population.87 Albert
Florence was arrested and subsequently detained at Burlington County
Detention Center and Essex County Correctional Facility, both in New
Jersey.88 Florence’s arrest stemmed from a traffic stop in which a state
trooper observed that he had an outstanding bench warrant in the statewide
computer database.89 The bench warrant was issued in 2003 when
Florence fell behind on a fine’s monthly payments.90 While Florence paid
the outstanding balance approximately one week after the warrant was
issued, the warrant remained in the statewide computer database in error.91
Prison officials at both facilities strip searched Florence during the intake
process.92
Florence challenged the strip searches at both facilities.93 Florence
argued that if a new detainee was not arrested for a weapons or drugs
offense, or a serious crime, correctional officers should not strip search
that detainee.94 Non-violent detainees should be exempt from strip
searches unless a correctional officer has “a particular reason to suspect”
they are hiding contraband.95 Noting that the seriousness of an offense
does not accurately predict which inmate has contraband, the Court
rejected Florence’s argument.96
The Court deferred to correctional officers’ expertise regarding
necessary safety measures and reasoned that a universal strip search policy
is reasonable unless there is “substantial evidence” suggesting the policy
is an exaggerated response to the situation.97 The Court reasoned that three
main risks justify a universal strip search policy in correctional facilities:
(1) the “danger of introducing lice or contagious infections[;]” (2) “the
increasing number of gang members who go through the intake process[;]”
and (3) “contraband concealed by new detainees[.]”98 Contraband is
anything “possessed in violation of prison rules,” and includes weapons,
87

See 566 U.S. 318, 322–23 (2012).
Id. at 323.
89 See id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 323–24.
93 See Florence, 566 U.S. at 323–24.
94 Id. at 334.
95 See id.
96 See id.
97 Id. at 330 (internal quotations and citation omitted). The Court did not explicitly
define “substantial evidence”.
98 See id. at 330–33.
88

356

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 14:343

drugs, alcohol, knives, razor blades, scissors, glass shards, crack, heroin,
marijuana, lighters, matches, and even “an overlooked pen.”99
Correctional officers’ professional expertise allows them to create and
implement reasonable search policies to detect and prevent the possession
of these items in their facilities, and determine whether a universal strip
search policy is “reasonably related to legitimate security interests.”100
The Court noted that because those arrested for minor offenses may
still smuggle contraband, or those not subject to strip searches may be
coerced into smuggling contraband into the jail, it is impractical to require
correctional officers to make an individualized assessment during the
intake process, as they usually know very little about the new detainee’s
history.101 In addition, “during the pressures of the intake process[,]” most
correctional officers are ill suited to make quick determinations that an
inmate’s underlying offenses warrant a strip search.102 Because jails are
dangerous places, where admitting new inmates creates various risks for
existing inmates, facility staff, and the new inmate, correctional officers
have a legitimate security interest in conducting a thorough search of the
new inmate “as a standard part of the intake process.”103 As a result, the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments do not require correctional officers to
have reasonable suspicion that a detainee is smuggling contraband, before
conducting a strip search.104 While the Court left open the possibility for
an exception to a universal strip search policy, such as when a detainee is
not admitted to the general population and does not have significant
contact with other detainees, it never addressed whether its holding would
apply to juvenile detainees held in juvenile detention centers.105
IV. THE THIRD CIRCUIT INCORRECTLY DECIDED J.B. V. FASSNACHT
Despite acknowledging that juveniles are especially susceptible to
psychological damage from the trauma of a strip search, the Third Circuit
nevertheless found that the state’s legitimate interest in ensuring that the
facility is secure outweighs a juvenile detainee’s privacy interests.106

99

Florence, 566 U.S. at 332–33 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 328.
101 See id. at 335–37 (noting that “[o]ther possible classifications based on
characteristics of individual detainees also might prove to be unworkable or even give rise
to charges of discriminatory application”).
102 Id. at 337.
103 Id. at 330–33 (citing authorities that state new inmates can bring disease, gang
violence, and contraband).
104 See id. at 339 (The procedures in place at the New Jersey detention centers “struck
a reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the needs of the institutions.”).
105 Florence, 566 U.S. at 338–39.
106 J.B. v. Fassnacht, 801 F.3d 336, 342, 344 (3d Cir. 2015).
100
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While this may be true for adult facilities, a juvenile correctional facility
needs a more specific reason for conducting a full body-cavity inspection
of a juvenile detainee. Juvenile privacy rights outweigh a facility’s
legitimate interests in prison management because juveniles are more
psychologically and developmentally fragile, and because they do not
present the same institutional security risks as adult inmates. As such, the
standard provided in Safford v. Redding should govern. Before conducting
a strip search, a correctional official must have individualized, reasonable
suspicion that a juvenile detainee is dangerous or hiding contraband.
A. The Third Circuit did not Meaningfully Consider Psychological and
Developmental Factors that Distinguish Juveniles from Adults
i. Adolescent Psychological Development
“[Y]outh is more than a chronological fact.”107 Research of brain
development and function proves that juveniles are different from
adults.108 For example, the “Dual Systems Model” of adolescent brain
development suggests that adolescents might experience a temporal gap in
brain development.109 Specifically, portions of the brain linked to puberty
and reward seeking behavior mature early, causing risky behavior to peak
during “middle adolescence,” whereas areas of the brain responsible for
restraint, judgment, and planning are not fully mature until the midtwenties.110 This explains why adolescents are immature, impulsive, and
often reckless.111
Adolescents are also more vulnerable to peer
influence than adults.112 Desire for peer approval and fear of rejection
often cause adolescents to engage in antisocial behavior, especially around
age fourteen or fifteen, to “impress their friends or to conform to peer
107 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 476 (2012) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
108 See, e.g., Teena Willoughby et al., Examining the link between adolescent brain
development and risk taking from a social-development perspective, reprinted in Brain and
Cognition 89 (2014).
109 Id. at 70.
110 See id. at 70–72; see also Elizabeth S. Scott “Children are Different”: Constitutional
Values and Justice Policy, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. LAW 71, 87 (2013) (commenting that “[a]
growing body of developmental neuroscience research indicates that the areas of the brain
that govern impulse control, planning, and foresight of consequences mature slowly over
the course of adolescence and into early adulthood, while the arousal of the limbic system
around puberty increases sensation seeking in early adolescence”) (internal citation
omitted).
111 See Jesse-Justin Cuevas & Tonja Jacobi, The Hidden Psychology of Constitutional
Criminal Procedure, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 2184 (2016); see also Miller, 567 U.S. at
476 (noting that adolescence is a period of “immaturity, irresponsibility, impetuousness,
and recklessness”) (internal quotations, alteration and citation omitted).
112 SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7, at 38.
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expectations.”113 The importance of peer approval in adolescence is
especially prominent in group situations and a major reason why
adolescents, more so than adults, commit crimes in groups.114 During this
phase of immaturity, adolescents are “in the process of separating from
their parents and forming their adult personal identities, a process that
involves exploration and . . . experimentation in risky activities”; as a
result, adolescent criminal activity is often a result of experimentation, or
testing limits, in contrast to adult criminal activity, which reflects
“individual preferences and values.”115 This suggests that juvenile crime
is psychologically different than adult crime.
Due to their developmental immaturity, adolescents are also more
vulnerable to coercive circumstances and are less able to respond
appropriately to external pressures adults could resist.116 For example,
juveniles are developmentally disadvantaged in police-citizen
encounters.117 As decision makers, juveniles are less able to advocate for
themselves when confronted by “older and much more socially and
politically dominating authority, such as a police officer.”118 Adolescents
have little “real-world” experience, and due to their “present-oriented
thinking, egocentrism, [and] greater conformity to authority figures,” they
are more vulnerable to stress and fear, which means that what an adult
perceives as a benign street encounter with a police officer, an adolescent
is more likely to feel that his or her freedom is limited.119 In addition, since
adolescents are impulsive, they may respond to perceived threats more
aggressively or emotionally than adults.120
During adolescence, privacy becomes increasingly important.121 As
puberty begins, adolescents begin to make “thorough assessment[s]” of
themselves.122 During this time of “critical self-appraisal[,]” adolescents
are more self-conscious and more vulnerable to embarrassment than their
113

Id. at 38–39.
Id. at 39.
115 See id. at 35 (emphasis in original).
116 Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Less Guilty by Reason of Adolescence:
Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile Death Penalty, 58
AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGIST
1009,
1014
(2003),
available
at
https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/d8c2/85bc13a00babbb93928f72f551f04d741f72.pdf.
117 Cuevas & Jacobi, supra note 111, at 2184.
118 Id. at 2185.
119 See id.
120 See Scott & Steinberg, supra note 116.
121 Brief for American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, J.B. v. Fassnacht, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 2036 (No. 15-903), 2016 U.S.
S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 729, *18.
122 F. PHILIP RICE & KIM G. DOLGIN, THE ADOLESCENT: DEVELOPMENT, RELATIONSHIPS,
AND CULTURE168 (Pearson) (11th ed. 2005). See also Elizabeth S. Scott, Blaming Youth,
81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 819 (2003) (referring to adolescence as a period of “identity crisis”).
114
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adult counterparts.123 The vulnerability and sensitivity juveniles have
regarding their bodies and interactions with authority figures suggest that
a strip search upon intake to a detention facility will be very traumatic.
Indeed, juveniles may feel like they are being sexually assaulted during a
strip search and may be “retraumatize[d]” if they are already suffering
from a psychiatric disorder or PTSD.124
ii. The Third Circuit Ignored Supreme Court Precedent Finding Age
to be a Determinative Factor in Accessing Culpability
In three significant cases, Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and
Miller v. Alabama, the Supreme Court relied on psychological and
developmental data and found that age was a determinative factor in
assessing juvenile culpability at sentencing.125 While these cases address
juvenile culpability, the evidence the Court relies on in each decision is
equally applicable to juvenile vulnerability.126 A juvenile offender’s
developmental immaturity, impulsivity, susceptibility to peer pressure,
and insecurity is the same whether the juvenile is being housed at a
detention center pre-trial, or standing before a judge at sentencing.
In 2005, the Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment
protection against cruel and unusual punishment forbids imposing the
death penalty upon juvenile offenders under eighteen years old.127
Significantly, the Court provided three reasons why—psychologically and
developmentally—juvenile offenders are less culpable than adult
offenders.128 First, juveniles tend to lack maturity and have an
underdeveloped sense of responsibility, as compared to adults.129

123

RICE & DOLGIN, supra note 122.
See Brief for American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, supra note
121, at *29; see also OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PTSD, TRAUMA, AND COMORBID PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS IN DETAINED
YOUTH 5, 9 (June 2013), https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/239603.pdf (finding PTSD common
among juvenile detainees and that “conditions of confinement often exacerbate symptoms
of mental disorder, including PTSD . . . . Juvenile justice providers must reduce the
likelihood that routine processing will retraumatize youth.”) (internal citations omitted).
125 See 543 U.S. 551, 568, 569–71 (2005); 560 U.S. 48, 68–69, 74–75 (2010); 567 U.S.
460, 465, 471–73 (2012).
126 See id.
127 See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568, 578 (noting that “[c]apital punishment must be limited
to those offenders who commit a narrow category of the most serious crimes and whose
extreme culpability makes them the most deserving of execution[]”) (internal quotations
and citation omitted).
128 Id. at 569–70 (noting that these “differences between juveniles under 18 and adults
demonstrate that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified among the worst
offenders”).
129 Id. at 569.
124
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Statistically, adolescents are the most reckless out of any age group.130
Second, “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures, including peer pressure.”131 The Court
noted that youth is not simply a chronological fact, but “a time and
condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and
to psychological damage[.]”132 Finally, juvenile character traits are
considered temporary, and not fully formed.133
The Court also noted that the two social purposes of the death
penalty—retribution and deterrence—do not provide a sufficient
justification for imposing it upon juvenile offenders.134 Because a
juvenile’s culpability or blameworthiness, due to youth and immaturity is
diminished, the argument for retribution is not as strong as with an adult
offender.135 As for deterrence, juveniles are less likely than adults to make
a “cost-benefit analysis” before engaging in criminal conduct; as a result,
the possibility of execution does not factor into their decision making. 136
Five years after Roper, the Supreme Court held that a sentence of life
without parole violates the Eighth Amendment’s protection against cruel
and unusual punishment when imposed on juveniles who commit a nonhomicide offense.137 Similar to Roper, the Court in Graham v. Florida
reasoned that “developments in psychology and brain science continue to
show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.”138
Indeed, research indicated that sections of the brain that regulate behavior
control are still developing in late adolescence.139
The Court
reemphasized Roper’s holding that because juvenile offenders are less
culpable, they are also less deserving of the most serious kinds of
punishment.140 The Court continued, “‘[f]rom a moral standpoint it would
be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult[.]’”141

130

See id.
Id. (internal citation omitted)
132 Id. (noting that juveniles have less control over their environment, as they do not
have the same freedom as adults to remove themselves from a “criminogenic setting”)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
133 Roper, 543 U.S. at 570.
134 Id. at 572.
135 Id. at 571 (noting retribution can be attempting “to express the community’s moral
outrage” or “to right the balance for the wrong to the victim”).
136 See id. at 572.
137 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74–75 (2010).
138 Id. at 68 (internal citations omitted).
139 Id. (internal citations omitted).
140 Id. (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
141 Id. (first alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 570).
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In 2012, the Supreme Court held that mandatory life without parole
sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.142 Pointing to its
prior decisions in Roper and Graham, the Court in Miller v. Alabama
reiterated that “children are different” from adults.143 Moreover, because
juveniles are less culpable and more amenable to rehabilitation than adults,
they are “‘less deserving of the most severe punishments.’”144 In that
regard, criminal procedure laws that ignore defendants’ youthfulness are
flawed.145 The Court even opined that “it is the odd legal rule that does
not have some form of exception for children.”146
B. The Third Circuit Failed to Treat Juveniles Differently when it Found
that Risks and Dangers at Juvenile Detention Facilities were the Same as
Adult Jails
The Third Circuit found that the three institutional security risks that
the Florence Court identified with respect to adult facilities also applied
to juvenile detention facilities.147 A juvenile detention facility can
implement a universal strip search policy because (1) new detainees could
introduce lice or contagious infections to the general population; (2) an
increased number of gang members going through the intake process
increases the likelihood of violence in the facility; and (3) new detainees
may conceal contraband.148 The Third Circuit stated,
There is no easy way to distinguish between juvenile and adult detainees in
terms of the security risks cited by the Supreme Court in Florence. Indeed,
[a] detention center, police station, or jail holding cell is a place fraught with
serious security dangers. These security dangers to the institution are the same
whether the detainee is a juvenile or an adult.149
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Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
Id. at 481.
144 Id. at 471–73 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 68). The Court noted that “transient
rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences—both lessened a
[juvenile]’s ‘moral culpability’ and enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and
neurological development occurs, [the juvenile’s] ‘deficiencies will be reformed.’” (citing
Graham, 560 U.S. at 68 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 570)).
145 Id. at 473–74 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 76).
146 Id. at 481 (pointing out that the Roper and Graham sentencing decisions are not at
odds with the law because “‘[o]ur history is replete with laws and judicial recognition’ that
children cannot be viewed simply as miniature adults” (emphasis in original) (citing J.D.B.
v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274 (2011)). See also SCOTT & STEINBERG, supra note 7,
at 11 (pointing out that “[i]n virtually every other area of legal regulation, adolescents (and
especially younger teenagers) are not treated like adults”) (internal citation omitted)
(emphasis in original).
147 J.B. v. Fassnacht, 801 F.3d 336, 342 (3d Cir. 2015).
148 See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 330–33 (2012).
149 Fassnacht, 801 F.3d at 343 (alteration in original) (internal quotations and citation
omitted).
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If “[juveniles] are different,”150 then juvenile and adult detainee
security risks are also different. This is consistent with American laws and
judicial precedent and demonstrates that juveniles “cannot be viewed
simply as miniature adults.”151 It is therefore incorrect to conclude
security dangers at correctional facilities are the same whether the detainee
is a juvenile or adult.
Adult jails house significantly more detainees than juvenile facilities.
The security risks at adult jails are ordinarily much greater.152 For
example, the Essex County Jail, where Florence was detained, is the
largest county jail in New Jersey.153 Essex County Jail admits more than
25,000 inmates annually and houses approximately “1,000 gang members
at any given time.”154 In 2014, when J.B.’s case was pending before the
District Court, 56% of juvenile facilities in the United States housed
twenty or fewer residents.155 Only twenty-two of 1,852 (or 1%) juvenile
facilities in the United States house 200 or more residents.156 This means
that at any given time, an adult facility like Essex County Jail is housing
five times as many detainees as one of the largest juvenile facilities, not
including the non-gang member detainees.
In 2015, LCYIC, where J.B. was detained, has a Detention program,
a Shelter program, and a “P.U.L.S.E. Weekend Program,” with a 60-bed
capacity, 24-bed capacity, and 12-bed capacity, respectively.157 Forty-five
150

Miller, 567 U.S. at 481.
J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 274 (internal citation omitted).
152 See Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Welfare and Fairness in Juvenile Crime Regulation,
71 LA. L. REV. 35, 66–67 (2010) (noting that “more than 40% of [adult] prisons house more
than 500 prisoners; and many have an inmate population of more than 1,000,” compared
to some of the largest training schools that house approximately 125 juveniles) (internal
citations omitted).
153 Florence, 566 U.S. at 324 (internal citation omitted).
154 Id.
155 OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK: JUVENILES IN RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT BY FACILITY
SIZE
AND
FACILITY
TYPE
(2014),
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/corrections/qa08501.asp?qaDate=2014 (but noting that
54% of juvenile offenders were held in facilities holding 21–100 (residents).
156 Id. In 2016, new data was released, however, the statistics remain largely the same.
For example, 56% of juvenile facilities in the United States still house twenty or fewer
residents and less than one percent of juvenile facilities house 200 or more residents. See
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK: JUVENILES IN RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT BY FACILITY SIZE AND
FACILITY
TYPE
(2016),
https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/corrections/qa08501.asp?qaDate=2016&text=yes&mapli
nk=link1.
157 2015 Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) Annual Report Lancaster County Youth
Intervention
Center,
http://www.lcyic.com/index_htm_files/YIC%20PREA%20Annual%20Report%202015.p
df. In 2017, the Detention program had a 48-bed capacity, the Shelter program had a 32151
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juveniles were held in the facility on December 31, 2015.158 In total, 532
juveniles were admitted to the facility in 2015.159 This yearly total is less
than half the population of Essex County Jail on any given day. A
categorical rule requiring universal strip searches at a facility like Essex
County Jail makes sense; however, a juvenile facility like LCYIC or even
a facility housing 200 juveniles cannot take the administratively easy way
out. Common sense dictates that a facility housing more than 1,000 adults
is going to have a greater security risk than a facility housing forty-five
juveniles ages ten through eighteen.160 A facility like Essex County jail is
undoubtedly going to have greater security risks than a juvenile facility
like LCYIC, because in larger facilities, “violence levels are higher, staffinmate relationships are more impersonal, and the organizational structure
is more rigid.”161 If a strip search of a juvenile detainee is going to occur,
it must be based on individualized, reasonable suspicion that the juvenile
is dangerous or smuggling contraband.
Moreover, juvenile facilities generally provide more programs and
offer a more rehabilitative setting than adult facilities.162 Many juvenile
facilities have a ratio of about one teacher per fifteen juveniles, and
juveniles at a facility in Florida, for example, have “academic classes,
skills training, counseling, and recreational activities” on a daily basis.163
In addition, self-report studies discovered that juveniles in juvenile
facilities have higher positive attitudes than juveniles housed in adult
facilities.164 This too may indicate that security threats at juvenile facilities
are not as high as the Third Circuit suggests.

bed capacity, and the “P.U.L.S.E. Weekend Program” capacity remained the same. 2017
Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) Annual Report Lancaster County Youth Intervention
Center,
http://www.lcyic.com/index_htm_files/YIC%20PREA%20Annual%20Report%202017.p
df.
158 2015 PREA Annual Report, supra note 157.
159 Id. The population at LCYIC has decreased since 2015. In 2016, 499 juveniles were
admitted, and in 2017, 419 juveniles were admitted. 2017 PREA Annual Report, supra
note 157.
160 2015 PREA Annual Report, supra note 157 (housing “males and females from the
ages of 10 to 18”).
161 Elizabeth S. Scott, supra note 152, at 67 (noting “[i]nstitutional size affects the
experience of inmates in several ways”) (internal citation omitted).
162 See id. at 70–71.
163 Id. (internal citations omitted).
164 Id. at 71.
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V. AN INDIVIDUALIZED, REASONABLE SUSPICION STANDARD
COMPORTS WITH TRADITIONAL FOURTH AMENDMENT PRINCIPLES
A. The Fourth Amendment and the Requirement of Individualized,
Reasonable Suspicion
The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of “persons, houses, papers, and effects[.]”165 The Supreme Court
often begins with the presumption that a government official must have a
warrant supported by probable cause to conduct a search.166 Probable
cause exists when “there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found” in the area searched.167 The requirement of a
warrant supported by probable cause, however, is at a best a default rule,
for the Supreme Court has enumerated several exceptions to the probable
cause and warrant requirement. These exceptions include exigent
circumstances,168 searches incident to arrest,169 consent searches,170
automobile and container searches,171 plain view searches,172 stop and frisk
searches,173 and administrative searches.174 In practice, these exceptions
outnumber searches pursuant to a warrant supported by probable cause. In
some situations, such as the strip search of a juvenile detainee, though the
search lacks a warrant, the requirement of individualized, reasonable
suspicion is the proper default rule.
In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court held that when a police officer
has reasonable suspicion “that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
person[] with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,”
he may conduct a limited search of that person’s outer clothing, also
known as a “frisk,” in order to find any weapons which might jeopardize
his safety.175 The purpose of the Terry stop and frisk exception is police
officer and community safety.176 The Supreme Court reasoned that an
165

U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356–57 (1967).
167 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–39 (1983).
168 Warden, Maryland Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Michigan v.
Fisher, 558 U.S. 45 (2009).
169 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454
(1981).
170 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
171 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565
(1991).
172 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
173 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
174 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004); Maryland v. King, 569 U.S.
435 (2013); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); Nat’l Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
175 392 U.S. at 8, 30–31 (1968).
176 See id. at 23–24, 26.
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officer must be able to search a potentially armed and dangerous individual
to protect himself and other potential victims of violence, even if that
officer lacks probable cause to arrest that individual.177 The Court noted
that “[t]he scope of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.”178 Therefore, the
officer must limit his search of the individual to areas where a weapon may
be hidden.179
The Supreme Court echoed its reasoning in Terry when it required
school officials to possess some individualized, reasonable suspicion prior
to searching a student.180 In Safford, for example, the Supreme Court found
that the “content of the suspicion” must match “the degree of intrusion.”181
Furthermore, the school official must possess a reasonable suspicion that
the hidden contraband poses a danger to other students, or in the words of
the Terry Court, “other prospective victims of violence.”182
These cases demonstrate that implicit in the Fourth Amendment’s
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is the principle that
a government official must have probable cause or reasonable suspicion
prior to searching an individual. At the very least, a government official
must have some reason to suspect an individual of wrongdoing before
searching that individual’s person or effects.
B. Administrative Searches
Another string of cases in which the Supreme Court carved out an
exception to the probable cause and warrant requirement are
administrative searches. Rather than look to whether a government
official possesses probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the Supreme
Court conducts a balancing test in which it weighs “[an] individual’s
legitimate expectations of privacy and personal security” against “the
government’s need for effective methods to deal with breaches of public

Id. at 24, 29 (noting “[t]he sole justification of the search in the present situation is
the protection of the police officer and others nearby[]”).
178 Id. at 19 (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967)).
179 Id. at 26, 29 (noting the search “must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion
reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the
assault of the police officer”).
180 New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (noting that “[t]he school setting
also requires some modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify
a search”); Safford United School District #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370 (2009) (noting
that a school official can base his or her decision to search a student based on a “standard
of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause”).
181 See Safford, 557 U.S. at 375.
182 See id. at 368, 376–77; Terry, 392 U.S. at 24.
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order.”183 Administrative searches depart from traditional Fourth
Amendment principles, because the primary concern in these situations is
whether the government is “reasonably pursuing a legitimate government
interest.”184 If the government is pursuing a legitimate interest, the
requirement of probable cause, and possibly reasonable suspicion,
requirements vanishes.185
Border searches are a form of administrative search.186 In United
States v. Flores-Montano, the Supreme Court found that the government’s
legitimate interest “in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and
effects is at its zenith at the international border.”187 A sovereign’s
longstanding right to protect itself gives government officials authority to
conduct suspicionless searches at its borders, which can include
disassembling and reassembling a car’s fuel tank to search for
contraband.188 In this context, the government’s interest in protecting
international borders outweighs the individual’s possessory interest.189
The Supreme Court has also used the balancing test to hold that DNA
buccal swabs of every individual arrested for burglary or a crime of
violence serves a legitimate government interest of identifying dangerous
individuals, individuals who might flee, or individuals who were
wrongfully convicted.190 The Supreme Court in Maryland v. King noted
that the government interest must outweigh the invasiveness of the
search.191 In this case, that balancing test was satisfied because the
government interest in identifying arrestees was great while the intrusion
was minimal.192 In addition, the DNA data collected from the buccal swab
merely provided identification, as it did not reveal the arrestee’s genetic
traits.193
Sobriety checkpoints offer another example of an administrative
search in which no reasonable suspicion is required.194 Instead, police
183

T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337. Arguably, T.L.O. and Safford could fall into the
administrative exception; however, given the centrality of the reasonable suspicion
standard in these cases, they are much more aligned with Terry v. Ohio, and the traditional
Fourth Amendment principles that a government official possess some justification for
searching an individual.
184 Eve Brensike Primus, Disentangling Administrative Searches, 111 COLUM. L. REV.
254, 255 (2011).
185 See id. at 255–57.
186 Id. at 255.
187 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004).
188 See id. at 152–53, 155–56.
189 See id. at 155.
190 Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 451–56 (2013).
191 See id. at 461.
192 Id. at 460–63.
193 See id. at 464–65.
194 See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 447 (1990)
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officers stop all vehicles, then examine the driver for signs of
intoxication.195 If the officer observes signs of intoxication, he or she may
conduct additional sobriety tests.196 In this context, the Supreme Court has
found that the state’s interest in eradicating drunk driving outweighs the
minimal intrusion imposed on motorists during the brief stop.197
In a similar fashion, the government may impose a uniform drug
testing policy on customs officials who carry firearms and are involved in
drug interdiction.198 The Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he Customs
Service is our Nation’s first line of defense” against illicit drug smuggling
which affects “the health and welfare of our population.”199 In this
context, the national interest of protecting international borders outweighs
the interference with individual liberty, caused by submitting to a
urinalysis test.200
These cases demonstrate that administrative searches implicitly seek
to protect against a danger that would have widespread consequences. The
government interest in protecting public roads and international borders
justifies a search of personal belongings such as a car fuel tank, or a search
of an individual, such as swabbing the inside of his or her mouth to obtain
a DNA sample, asking him or her to submit to a sobriety test, or requiring
him to submit a urine sample. Though inconvenient, the physical intrusion
caused by administrative searches is minimal, certainly much less invasive
than a strip search, which exposes “intimate parts.”201
C. The Individualized Suspicion Standard Provided in Safford United
School District #1 v. Redding Should Govern Strip Searches of Juvenile
Detainees
When determining whether an invasive search of the body is
appropriate, the most important factor to consider is who is being searched
and why, not where they are being searched. In other words, while it may
be easier to find that Florence governs juvenile detention center strip
searches because Florence addresses detainee treatment, the line should
not be drawn at “detention center,” rather, it should be drawn at “juvenile.”
Juveniles have been, and should continue to be treated differently than
195

Id.
Id. See also Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2176–77 (2016) (noting
that like a DNA buccal swab, the physical intrusion of a breath test is “almost negligible,”
and the experience is unlikely to cause embarrassment).
197 Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 496 U.S. at 451–52.
198 Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 661–62, 664, 667
(1989).
199 Id. at 668.
200 See id. at 670–71.
201 Safford United School District #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377 (2009)
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adults. In Safford, the Supreme Court found that a school official must
have reasonable suspicion of danger or that a student is hiding contraband
in his or her underwear, before strip searching that student.202 Without
such reasonable suspicion, an invasive search is unconstitutional.203 A
strip search is categorically distinct from a search of a student’s backpack
or outer clothing because it invades “subjective and reasonable societal
expectations of personal privacy” by exposing intimate parts and causing
embarrassment, fright, and humiliation.204 Under the Safford Court’s
reasoning, a strip search “require[es] distinct elements of justification on
the part of school authorities for going beyond a search of outer clothing
and belongings.”205 Those distinct elements are a reasonable belief under
the circumstances that there is danger or that student has resorted to hiding
contraband in his or her underwear.206 This is the proper standard that
should be applied in the juvenile detention center context.
Applying Safford’s standard, the concerns articulated by the Third
Circuit in J.B. v. Fassnacht, that correctional officials must be able to
check for lice or contagious infections, gang symbols or tattoos, and signs
of “self-mutilation or abuse in the home,” do not necessitate the degree of
intrusion that a strip search entails.207 Certainly, correctional officials can
detect lice and gang tattoos through a less invasive search, and if the
juvenile detention center is concerned with self-mutilation or abuse in the
home, surely a medical or psychological exam would better reveal those
issues than a strip search upon intake.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Third Circuit agreed that because a strip search creates a
“substantial
risk
of
psychological
damage
for
juvenile
detainees . . . juvenile[s] maintain[] an enhanced right to privacy.”208 Still,
the Third Circuit found, paradoxically, that in a detention center setting,
juveniles present the same risks and dangers as adults; therefore, a blanket
strip search policy at a juvenile detention center is constitutionally
permissible.209 Moreover, the Third Circuit failed to meaningfully
consider the psychological and developmental differences between
juveniles and adults. Those differences do not disappear simply because
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a juvenile is detained or has committed a crime, and it is morally
misguided “‘to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a
greater possibility exists that a minor’s character deficiencies will be
reformed.’”210 Juveniles are different, and if a detention center is going to
strip search a juvenile, there must be an individualized, reasonable
suspicion that the juvenile is dangerous or smuggling contraband. Not
only does a requirement of individualized, reasonable suspicion take into
account that juveniles are psychologically and developmentally different
than adults, but it comports with traditional Fourth Amendment principles
that require a government official to have some level of suspicion of
wrongdoing prior to searching an individual.
The mere fact of a juvenile’s admission to a juvenile detention center
is not enough to justify a blanket strip search policy because the safety
risks are not the same as those in an adult facility, and the concerns
expressed by the Third Circuit, or the “content of suspicion” simply do not
match the intrusiveness of a strip search. As the Supreme Court noted, “it
is the odd legal rule that does not have some form of exception for
children.”211 Whether it is at sentencing, or during pretrial detention, legal
rules, including strip search polices, must take into account that juveniles
are different.

210 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010) (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
570 (2005).
211 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 481 (2012) (emphasis in original).

